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Abstract: Full network level privacy has often been categorized into four sub-categories:
Identity, Route, Location and Data privacy. Achieving full network level privacy is a critical
and challenging problem due to the constraints imposed by the sensor nodes (e.g., energy,
memory and computation power), sensor networks (e.g., mobility and topology) and QoS
issues (e.g., packet reach-ability and timeliness). In this paper, we proposed two new identity,
routeandlocationprivacyalgorithmsanddataprivacymechanismthataddressesthisproblem.
The proposed solutions provide additional trustworthiness and reliability at modest cost of
memory and energy. Also, we proved that our proposed solutions provide protection against
various privacy disclosure attacks, such as eavesdropping and hop-by-hop trace back attacks.
Keywords: anonymity; eavesdropping; hop-by-hop trace back; privacy; routing; wireless
sensor networksSensors 2010, 10 1448
1. Introduction
With the spreading application of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in various sensitive areas such
as health-care, military, habitat monitoring, etc, the need to ensure security and privacy is becoming
imperatively important. For example, in battleﬁeld application scenario, “the location of a soldier should
not be exposed if he initiates broadcast query” [1]. In the meantime, query must be transferred to the
destination in an encrypted manner via only trusted en-route nodes. Similarly, in habitat monitoring
application scenarios, such as Great Duck Island [2] or Save-the-panda application [3] where large
numbers of sensor nodes are deployed to observe the vast habitat of ducks and pandas, an adversary
can try to capture the panda or duck by back-tracing the routing path until it reaches the source sensor
nodes. Therefore, inordertopreventtheadversaryfromback-tracing, theroute, locationanddataprivacy
mechanisms must be enforced. With respect to these application scenarios, network level privacy has
often been categorized into four categories:
1. Sender node identity privacy: no intermediate node can get any information about who is sending
the packets except the source, its immediate neighbors and the destination,
2. Sender node location privacy: no intermediate node can have any information about the location
(in terms of physical distance or number of hops) about the sender node except the source, its
immediate neighbors and the destination,
3. Route privacy: no node can predict the information about the complete path (from source to
destination). Also, a mobile adversary gets no clue to trace back the source node either from
the contents and/or directional information of the captured packet(s), and
4. Data packet privacy: no node can see the information inside in a payload of the data packet except
the source and the destination.
Existing privacy schemes such as [1, 3–7], that have speciﬁcally been proposed for WSNs only
provide partial network level privacy. Providing a full network level privacy is a critical and challenging
issue due to the constraints imposed by the sensor nodes (e.g., energy, memory and computation
power), sensor network (e.g., mobility and topology) and QoS issues (e.g., packet reach-ability and
trustworthiness). Thus, an energy-efﬁcient privacy solution is needed to address these issues.
In order to achieve this goal, we incorporate basic design features from related research ﬁelds such
as geographic routing and cryptographic systems. To our knowledge, we propose the ﬁrst full network
level privacy solution for WSNs. Our contribution lies in following features.
• A new Identity, Route and Location (IRL) privacy algorithm is proposed that ensures the
anonymity of source node’s identity and location. It also assures that the packets will reach their
destination by passing through only trusted intermediate nodes.
• A new reliable Identity, Route and Location (r-IRL) privacy algorithm is proposed, which is the
extension of our proposed IRL algorithm. This algorithm has the ability to forward packets from
multiple secure paths to increase the packet reach-ability.Sensors 2010, 10 1449
• A new data privacy mechanism is proposed, which is unique in the sense that it provides data
secrecy and packet authentication in the presence of identity anonymity.
Our solutions collectively provide protection against various privacy disclosure attacks such as
eavesdropping and hop-by-hop trace-back attacks. Also, our solutions are lightweight, hence consume
modest memory and energy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2. contains related work, Section 3. articulates
the network model, assumptions and adversary model. Section 4. describes the proposed privacy
schemes, Section 5. consists of analysis and evaluation, and Section 6. concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
2.1. Privacy Schemes
A number of a privacy schemes such as [1, 3–7] have been proposed for WSNs that are
discussed below.
C. Ozturk et al. [3] proposed a phantom routing scheme for WSNs, which helps to prevent the location
of a source from the attacker. In this scheme, each message reaches the destination in two phases: 1) a
walking phase, in which the message is unicasted in a random fashion within ﬁrst hwalk hops, 2) after
that, the message is ﬂooded using the baseline ﬂooding technique. The major advantage of their scheme
is the source location privacy protection, which improves as the network size and intensity increase
because of high path diversity. But on the other hand, if the network size increases, the ﬂooding phase
will consume more energy. This scheme does not provide identity privacy. Also, it is unable to provide
data secrecy in the presence of identity privacy.
P. Kamat et al. [4] proposed a phantom single-path routing scheme that works in a similar fashion as
the original phantom routing scheme [3]. The major difference between these two schemes is that after
the walking phase, a packet will be forwarded to the destination via a single path routing strategy such
as the shortest path routing mechanism. This scheme consumes less energy and requires slightly higher
memory as compared to ﬁrst one. This scheme also does not provide identity privacy. Also, it is unable
to provide data secrecy in the presence of identity privacy.
S.MisraandG.Xue[5]proposedtwoschemes: SimpleAnonymityScheme(SAS)andCryptographic
Anonymity Scheme (CAS) for establishing anonymity in clustered WSNs. The SAS scheme use
dynamic pseudonyms instead of true identity during communications. Each sensor node needs to store a
given range of pseudonyms that are non-contiguous. Therefore, the SAS scheme is not memory efﬁcient.
On the other hand, the CAS scheme uses keyed hash functions to generate pseudonyms. This scheme
is memory efﬁcient as compare to the SAS but it requires more computation power. The authors do
not propose any routing scheme. Sender node may always send packets to the destination via shortest
path. In that case, for an adversary who is capable of performing hop-by-hop trace back (with the help
of direction information) can ﬁnd out the location of the source node.
Y. Xi et al. [1] proposed a Greedy Random Walk (GROW) scheme to protect the location of the source
node. This scheme works in two phases. In a ﬁrst phase, the sink node will set up a path through random
walk with a node as a receptor. Then the source node will forward the packets towards the receptor in
a random walk manner. Once the packet reaches at the receptor, it will forward the packet to the sinkSensors 2010, 10 1450
node through the pre-established path. Here receptor is acting a central point between the sink and the
source node for every communication session. A criterion of selecting a trustworthy receptor is essential,
however not deﬁned in the author’s work.
Y. Ouyang et al. [7] proposed a Cyclic Entrapment Method (CEM) to minimize the chance of an
adversary in ﬁnding out the location of the source node. In the CEM, when the message is sent by the
source node to the base station, it will activate the predeﬁned loop(s) along the path. An activation node
will generate the fake message and forwarded it towards the loop, and original message is forwarded
to the base station via speciﬁc routing protocol such as shortest path. Energy consumption in the CEM
scheme is mainly dependent on the number of existing loops in the path and their size.
2.2. Geographic Routing Schemes
Our proposed privacy solutions incorporate the basic design features from geographic routing
schemes [6, 8–10] that are discussed below.
M. Zorzi and R. R. Rao [8, 9] proposed Geographic Random Forwarding (GeRaF) scheme for ad
hoc and sensor networks. This scheme is based on broadcast transmission and the sender only requires
the position of its own and the destination. All active neighborhood nodes who receive the packet will
go through the contention phase. Once the contention phase is complete, the winner (the node that is
closest to the destination) will relay the packet using the same mechanism. This process will repeat until
the destination becomes one-hop away. The authors assumed that all nodes in the neighborhood do not
remain active all the time. Due to the dynamics of the sleep modes, different sets of potential relays will
be available. However, mostly the potential route is close to the same or shortest route, which makes
easier for an adversary to trace back to the sender.
A. Capone et al. [10] proposed Simple Forwarding over Trajectory (SiFT) scheme. This scheme is
based on broadcast transmission and does not maintain neighborhood positions and states. Each node
who receives the packet will make the decision of forwarding that packet based only on its own position,
the position of a transmitter and the trajectory. The difference between the GeRaF [8, 9] and the SiFT
scheme is that, the GeRaF does not use trajectories but the position of the destination. If nodes are static
then similar to the GeRaF the potential route is close to the same or shortest route, which makes it easier
for an adversary to trace back to the sender.
A. D. Wood et al. [6] have proposed a conﬁgurable secure routing protocol family called Secure
Implicit Geographic Forwarding (SIGF) for WSNs. The SIGF is based on the Implicit Geographic
Forwarding (IGF) protocol [11], in which a packet is forwarded to the node that lies within the region of
60◦ sextant, centered on the direct line from the sender to the destination. The SIGF protocol provides
some aspects of networks privacy such as data, route and location privacy, but it does not provide
identity privacy. Another limitation of the SIGF protocol is that, when there is no trusted node within
a forwarding area (assuming 60◦ sextant), it will forward the packet to an un-trusted node. So, the
reliability of the path is affected.
Table 1 compares the proposed privacy preserving schemes. It clearly shows that none of the schemes
currently provide full network level privacy.Sensors 2010, 10 1451
Table 1. Comparison of privacy preserving schemes.
PFR [3] PSR [4] SAS & CAS [5] CEM [7] SIGF [6] GeRaF [8, 9] SiFT [10]
Required
information for
routing
ID of
destination
Routing
table (e.g.,
destination ID,
# of hops etc.)
Depending on a
routing scheme
Depending on a
routing scheme
Own,
destination, &
neighborhood
locations
Own and
destination
location
Destination
trajectory
and own
location
Transmission
mechanism
1st phase:
Point-to-point;
2nd phase:
Broadcast
Point-to-point
Depending on a
routing scheme
Depending on a
routing scheme
Point-to-point Broadcast Broadcast
Decision place
for forwarding
1st phase:
Transmitter;
2nd phase:
Receiver
Transmitter
Depending on a
routing scheme
Depending on a
routing scheme
Transmitter Receiver Receiver
Criteria for
forwarding
packet to next
hop
1st phase:
random; 2nd
phase: ﬂooding
1st phase:
random; 2nd
phase: shortest
in terms of
hops
Depending on a
routing scheme
Depending on a
routing scheme
Randomly
select any
trusted
node lies in
forwarding
region
Node that is
closer to the
destination
in terms of
location
Node that is
closer to the
destination
in terms of
trajectory
Identity privacy Not Available Not Available Available Not Available Not Available Not Applicable
Not
Applicable
Route privacy Available Available
Depending on a
routing scheme
Depending on a
routing scheme
Available Available Available
Location
privacy
Available Available Not Available Available Available Not Applicable
Not
Applicable
Data privacy Not Available Not Available Available Available Available Not Applicable
Not
Applicable
3. Network, Assumptions and Adversary Model
3.1. Network Model
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is composed of large number of small sensor nodes that are of
limited resource and densely deployed in an environment. Whenever end users require information
about any event related to some object(s), they send a query to the sensor network via the base station.
And the base station propagates that query to the entire network or to a speciﬁc region of the network.
In response to that query, sensor nodes send back required information to the base station. A typical
wireless sensor network scenario is shown in Figure 1. Links are bidirectional. Also, sensor nodes use
IEEE 802.11 standard link layer protocol, which keeps packets in its cache until the sender receives an
acknowledgment (ACK). Whenever a receiver (next hop) node successfully receives the packet it will
send back an ACK packet to the sender. If the sender node does not receive an ACK packet during
predeﬁned threshold time, then the sender node will retransmit that packet.Sensors 2010, 10 1452
Figure 1. Typical WSN scenario.
3.2. Assumptions
For reason of scalability, it is assumed that no sensor node needs to know the global network topology,
except that it must know the geographical location of its own, its neighboring nodes and the base station.
In order to ﬁnd out the location information, any proposed mechanism could be used, such as [12, 13].
It is assumed that each sensor node in the network can share a unique secret key with the base
station [14, 15]. These keys are periodically updated. The public key of the base station is also assumed
known to all the nodes in the network. Sensor nodes do not require their own public and private keys;
because computation cost of public and private keys is generally consider being high. However, many
researchers [16, 17] have shown the feasibility of using public key cryptography in wireless sensor
networks. It is also assumed that sensor nodes are capable of performing encryption and decryption
of the data by using any cipher algorithm such as DES, AES etc. This provides an additional layer
of security.
This paper only focuses on the development of a prevention strategy against network level privacy
disclosure attacks, such as eavesdropping, trafﬁc analysis and hop-by-hop trace back attacks. Other
general attacks, such as ﬂooding attacks, could be detected and prevented by using any IDS scheme
proposed for WSNS.
3.3. Adversary Model
We have assumed that an adversary can mostly perform passive attacks (like eavesdropping [18],
and trafﬁc analysis), since such attacks helps to conceal the adversary’s presence in the network.
Nevertheless, the adversary is also capable of performing some active attacks like fabrication and packet
drop attacks. We also assumed that the adversary is both device-rich and resource-rich [4]. These
characteristics are deﬁned below.
• Device-rich: the adversary is equipped with devices like antenna and spectrum analyzers, so that
the adversary can measure the angle of arrival of the packet and received signal strength. These
devices will help the adversary to ﬁnd out the immediate sender of the packet and move to that
node. This kind of hop-by-hop trace back mechanism will be carried out by the adversary until the
actual sender node is reached.Sensors 2010, 10 1453
• Resource-rich: the adversary has no resource constraint in computation power, memory or energy.
It is also assumed that the adversary has some basic domain knowledge like the range of identities
assigned to the sensor nodes, the public key of the base station and information about the cipher
algorithms used in the network. However, adversary has no knowledge which identity is physically
associated with which node.
A detection and prevention strategy against non-privacy disclosure attacks at various layers such as
jamming attacks is out of the scope of this paper. However, trust management methodology (Section 4.1)
that we adopted in this paper is useful to detect and prevent some non-privacy disclosure threats such as,
black hole attack, sink hole attack, and selective forwarding or gray hole attack.
4. Proposed Scheme
4.1. Concepts and Deﬁnitions
In our proposed algorithms, we have used two notions: direction and trust. Both these notions
(direction and trust) are used to provide reliable (non-malicious and non-faulty) secure paths for
achieving robust route privacy. Direction information will help to forward packet to the destination
in a timely manner and trust will help to forward the packets via reliable nodes. Detail deﬁnitions of
both notions are given below.
Direction: The ﬁrst notion used in our algorithms is that of direction. The physical location of
the base station is the reference point for each sensor node. Based on this reference point, each node
classiﬁes its neighboring nodes into four categories: (1) forward neighboring nodes (F), (2) right
side backward neighboring nodes (Br), (3) left side backward neighboring nodes (Bl), and (4) middle
backward neighboring nodes (Bm). The objective of this categorization is to provide more path diversity
as discussed in Section 4.2. A node x classiﬁes its neighboring node y in following fashion:
Cx,y =

   
   
F −π
2 ≤ θ ≤ π
2
Br
π
2 < θ ≤ 5π
6
Bm
5π
6 < θ ≤ 7π
6
Bl
7π
6 < θ < 3π
2
(1)
where θ is the angle between the node x and its neighboring node y with respect to the line joining
node x and the base station as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Neighbor node classiﬁcationSensors 2010, 10 1454
Trust: The second notion used in our algorithms is that of trust. The deﬁnition of a trust here is based
on our other paper [19] and restated here.
A node can be classiﬁed into one of the three categories [20]: trustworthy, untrustworthy, and
uncertain. A node is considered trustworthy if it interacts successfully most of the time with the other
nodes. A node is considered untrustworthy if it tries to do as many unsuccessful interactions as possible
with the other nodes. An untrustworthy node could be a faulty [21] or malicious node. A node is
considered uncertain if it performs both successful and unsuccessful interactions. Detailed deﬁnition
of the successful and unsuccessful interactions and trust calculation methodology is available in our
paper [22] and provided here in a simpliﬁed form.
A sender will consider an interaction successful if the sender receives conﬁrmation that the packet
is successfully received by the neighbor node and forwarded towards the destination in an unaltered
fashion. The ﬁrst requirement of successful reception is achieved on the reception of the link layer
acknowledgment (ACK). The second requirement of forwarding towards the destination is achieved
with the help of enhanced passive acknowledgment (PACK) by overhearing the transmission of a next
hop on the route, since they are within the radio range [23]. If the sender node does not overhear the
retransmission of the packet within a threshold time from its neighboring node or if the overheard packet
is found to be illegally fabricated (by comparing the payload that is attached to the packet), then the
sender node will consider that interaction as unsuccessful.
With the help of this simple approach, several attacks can be prevented, i.e., the black hole attack
is straightforwardly detected when malicious node drops the incoming packets and keeps sending self
generated packets [24]. Similarly, sink hole attack [25], an advanced version of the black hole attack,
is also easily detectable by looking at the passive acknowledgment. Likewise, the selective forwarding
attack [26] and gray-hole attack [27] can also be eliminated with the aid of above mentioned approach.
Based on these successful and unsuccessful interactions node x can calculate the trust value of node
y in following fashion:
Tx,y =
[
100
(
Sx,y
Sx,y + Ux,y
)(
1 −
1
Sx,y + 1
)]
(2)
where [.] is the nearest integer function, Sx,y is the total number of successful interactions of node x
with y during time δt, and Ux,y is the total number of unsuccessful interactions of node x with y during
time δt. After calculating trust value, a node will quantize trust into three states as follows:
Mp(Tx,y) =

 
 
trustworthy 100 − f ≤ Tx,y ≤ 100
uncertain 50 − g ≤ Tx,y < 100 − f
untrustworthy 0 ≤ Tx,y < 50 − g

 
 
. (3)
where, f represents half of the average values of all trustworthy nodes and g represents one-third of
the average values of all untrustworthy nodes. Both f and g are calculated as follows:
fj+1 =
{ [
1
2
(∑
i2Rx Tx;i
|Rx|
)]
0 < |Rx| ≤ n − 1
fj |Rx| = 0
(4)Sensors 2010, 10 1455
gj+1 =
{ [
1
3
(∑
i2Mx Tx;i
|Mx|
)]
0 < |Mx| ≤ n − 1
gj |Mx| = 0
(5)
where [.] is the nearest integer function, Rx represents the set of trustworthy nodes for node x, Mx
the set of untrustworthy nodes for node x, and n is the total number of nodes that contains trustworthy,
untrustworthy and uncertain nodes. The initial trust values of all nodes are 50, which represents the
uncertain state. Initially f and g are equal to 25 and 17 respectively, although other values could also
be used by keeping the following constraint intact: fi − gi ≥ 1, which is necessary for keeping the
uncertain zone between a trusted and untrustworthy zone. The values of f and g are adaptive. During
thesteady-stateoperation, thesevaluescanchangewitheverypassingunitoftimewhichcreatesdynamic
trust boundaries. At any stage, when |Rx| or |Mx| becomes zero, the value of fj+1 or gj+1 remains the
same as the previous values (fj and gj). The nodes whose values are above 100 − f will be declared
as trustworthy nodes (Equation 3), and nodes whose values are lower than 50 − g will be consider as
untrustworthy nodes (Equation 3). After each passage of time, ∆t, nodes will recalculate the values of
f and g. This trust calculation procedure will continue in this fashion.
The time window length (∆t) could be made shorter or longer based on the network analysis
scenarios. If ∆t is too short, then the calculated trust value may not reﬂect the reliable behavior. On the
other hand, if it is too long, then it will consume too much memory to store the interaction record at the
sensor node. Therefore, various parameters can be used to adjust the length of ∆t.
4.2. Identity, Route, and Location Privacy (IRL)
Our proposed identity, route and location privacy scheme works in two phases. The ﬁrst is neighbor
node state initialization phase, and the second is routing phase.
Route Privacy: In initialization phase, let the node i have m neighboring nodes in which t nodes are
trusted. So, 0 ≤ t ≤ m and M(t) = M(tF) ∪ M(tBr) ∪ M(tBl) ∪ M(tBm). Here M(tF), M(tBr),
M(tBl), and M(tBm) represent the set of trusted nodes that are in the forward, right backward, left
backward, and middle backward directions, respectively. These neighbor sets (M(tF), M(tBr), M(tBl),
and M(tBm)) are initialized and updated whenever a change occur in neighborhood. For example, the
entrance of a new node, change of a trust value, etc.
Whenever a node needs to forward a packet, the routing phase (Algorithm 1 for source node and
Algorithm 2 for intermediate node) of IRL algorithm is called.
Whenever a source node (Algorithm 1) wants to forwards the packet, it will ﬁrst check the availability
of the trusted neighboring nodes in its forward direction set M(tF) (Line 2). If trusted nodes exists then it
will randomly select one node as a next hop (Line 3) from the set M(tF) and forward the packet towards
it (Lines 13:21). If there is no trusted node in its forward direction, then the source node will check
the availability of a trusted node in the right (M(tBr)) and left (M(tBl)) backward sets. If the trusted
nodes are available then the source node will randomly select one node as a next hop (Line 3) from these
sets and forward the packet towards it (Lines 13:21). If the trusted node does not exist in these sets
either, then the source node will randomly select (Line 8) one trusted node from the backward middle
set (M(tBm)) and forward the packet towards it (Lines 13:21). If there are no trusted nodes available in
all of the sets then the packet will be dropped (Line 9:10).Sensors 2010, 10 1456
Algorithm 1 IRL - Routing at Source Node.
1: prevhop ← ∅; nexthop ← ∅;
2: if M(tF) ̸= ∅ then
3: nexthop(k) = Rand(M(tF));
4: else
5: if M(tBr) ∪ M(tBl) ̸= ∅ then
6: nexthop(k)= Rand(M(tBr) ∪ M(tBl));
7: else if M(tBm) ̸= ∅ then
8: nexthop(k)= Rand(M(tBm));
9: else
10: Drop packet and Exit;
11: end if
12: end if
13: Set prevhop = myid;
14: Form pkt p = {prevhop;nexthop;seqID;payload};
15: Create Signature and save in buffer;
16: Forward packet to nexthop;
17: Set timer ∆t = D
dnexthop
× pt;
18: while ∆t = true do
19: Signature remains in buffer;
20: end while
21: Signature removed from buffer;
When an intermediate node (Algorithm 2) receives the packet (either from the source node or from
another en-route node), it will ﬁrst check whether the packet is new or old (Line 3). If it is new, then the
node will ﬁrst check the availability of the trusted node from the forward direction set (MF) excluding
the prevhop node if it belongs to forward set (Line 13). If trusted nodes exists in the forward set then the
node will randomly select any one trusted node as a next hop (Line 14) and forward the packet towards
it (Line 45). If there is no trusted node available in the forward direction, then it will check to which
set the sender of the packet belongs to. For example, If the packet, forwarded by a node, belongs to the
right backward set (Line 16), then it will ﬁrst check whether the left or middle backward sets contain
any trusted nodes (Lines 17:18). If so, it will randomly select one node from those sets (Line 19) and
forward the packet towards it (Line 45). If there is no trusted node in those two sets, then the node will
randomly select a trusted node from the right backward set (M(tBr)) excluding the one from which the
node received the current packet (Lines 20:21) and forward the packet towards it (Line 45). Similar
operations will be performed, if the packet, forwarded by a node, belongs to the left (Lines 25:33) and
middle backward or forward (Lines 34:43) sets. An example IRL routing scenario is shown in Figure 3.Sensors 2010, 10 1457
Algorithm 2 IRL - Routing at Intermediate Node.
1: nexthop ← ∅;
2: Mtemp = ∅
3: if Signature of new packet already exists in buffer then
4: Mtemp = {Mtemp} + LasttimePrevhop
5: Mtemp = {Mtemp} + LasttimeNexthop
6: Set counter = timesReceviedBefore + 1;
7: Remove signature from buffer;
8: if counter = 3 then
9: Drop packet and exit;
10: end if
11: end if
12: Mtemp = {Mtemp} + prevhop
13: if (M(tF) − {M(tF)
∩
Mtemp}) ̸= ∅ then
14: nexthop(k) = Rand(M(tF) − {M(tF)
∩
Mtemp});
15: else
16: if packet came from Br then
17: Mtemp1 = M(tBl) ∪ M(tBm)
18: if Mtemp1 ̸= ∅ then
19: nexthop(k)= Rand(Mtemp1);
20: else if M(tBr) ̸= ∅ then
21: nexthop(k)= Rand(M(tBr) − {M(tBr)
∩
Mtemp});
22: else
23: Drop packet and Exit;
24: end if
25: else if packet came from Bl then
26: Mtemp2 = M(tBr) ∪ M(tBm)
27: if Mtemp2 ̸= ∅ then
28: nexthop(k)= Rand(Mtemp2 − {Mtemp2
∩
Mtemp});
29: else if M(tBl) ̸= ∅ then
30: nexthop(k)= Rand(M(tBl) − {M(tBl)
∩
Mtemp});
31: else
32: Drop packet and Exit;
33: end if
34: else
35: Mtemp3 = M(tBr) ∪ M(tBl)
36: if Mtemp3 ̸= ∅ then
37: nexthop(k)= Rand(Mtemp3 − {Mtemp3
∩
Mtemp});
38: else if M(tBm) ̸= ∅ then
39: nexthop(k)= Rand(M(tBm) − {M(tBm)
∩
Mtemp});
40: else
41: Drop packet and Exit;
42: end if
43: end if
44: end if
45: Rest is same as Algorithm 1 from lines 13:21;Sensors 2010, 10 1458
Figure 3. Sample routing scenario of IRL scheme.
This routing strategy may result in the creation of a cycle (loop). However, due to the randomness
in the selection of the next-hop and the presence of the different four direction sets, the probability of
creation of any cycle is very low. Nevertheless, in order to fully avoid the occurrence of the cycles, each
node (prior to forwarding of a packet) will save the signature of the packet in the buffer for the δt time,
that is:
δt = 2
(
D
d
× pt
)
(6)
where D is the distance between the forwarding node and the base station, d is the distance between the
forwarding node and the next hop, and pt is the propagation transfer time between the forwarding node
and the next hop. This signature consists of two ﬁelds: (1) sequence number of the packet, and (2) the
payload. The potential of the signature to compare and identify the same packet is detailed in the later
section. Corresponding to this signature, three more ﬁelds are also stored in the buffer: (1) previous
hop identity, (2) next hop identity where the packet is forwarded, and (3) counter, that tells how many
times the same packet is received by the node. This information will later be used to get rid of any cycle.
The size of the buffer is mainly dependent on the network trafﬁc conditions. However, it is expected
to be low due because the sensor nodes sent data either in periodic intervals or upon the occurrence of
some event.
Figure 4. Three sample cycle detection and prevention scenarios.
If the node received the packet whose signature exists in the buffer (Algorithm 2, Lines 3:11), then
including the previous hop node (Line 12), two other nodes will also be excluded from the selection ofSensors 2010, 10 1459
the next hop process: 1) the node from which last time the packet was received (Line 4) and 2) the node
from which last time the packet was forwarded (line 5). If the same packet is received three times by
the same node (Line 8) then the packet will be dropped (Line 9). Three sample scenarios of the loop
creation, detection and prevention are shown in Figure 4. Creation of loops and traversing of the packets
in the backward direction is not a completely negative effect. Rather, it provides positive effects in terms
of strengthening the route and source location privacy, because these effects will helps to increase the
safety period [3], which is the time for an adversary to reach at the source node.
Identity Privacy: Whenever a node receives the packet p from the source node or en-route node
then the receiving node will replace the previous hop’s identity prevhop contained in the packet with
its own (Algorithm 1, Line 13). After that, the node will get the next forwarding node nexthop (as
described earlier) and update the header of the packet p = {prevhop,nexthop,payload} (Line 14). After
modiﬁcation of the two header ﬁelds, the node will forward the packet (Line 16). In this way, all the
intermediate forwarding nodes replace the source and next hop’s identity contained in the packet p. This
process will go on until the packet reaches the base station.
Location Privacy: The neighboring nodes which are in each other’s radio range can easily
approximate the location of each other by measuring the received signal strength and the angle of
arrival [28]. If the adversary is within the range of the source node, then adversary can easily estimate
the location of the source. Once the packet has crossed the radio range of the original source node, then
becomes very difﬁcult for an attacker to estimate the location of the node either in terms of the physical
distance or in terms of the number of hops of an original source node. The main reason for this is that
the path selection is random and packets are forwarded by only trusted nodes which only contain the
information of the last and the next hop.
4.3. Reliable Identity, Route, and Location Privacy (r-IRL)
It is also possible that some applications require more reliability in terms of packet reach-ability;
and the packet could be dropped due to either network congestion or malicious behavior of an en-route
node. Thus, in order to achieve more reliability, the packet should be forwarded from multiple paths
simultaneously, which will give trustworthiness in the sense that at least the packet should reach the base
station by any one of the paths, although, this may increase some communication overhead.
Our reliable IRL (r-IRL) algorithm is the extended version of our proposed IRL algorithm, in which
we introduce one more parameter, reliability r. The source node i will multi-cast a packet to all r
randomly selected neighboring trusted nodes that are in the forward direction. If there are no adequate
trusted nodes present in the forward direction, then it will select the remaining trusted nodes from the
backward direction. The rest of the mechanism of the r-IRL algorithm is the same as the IRL algorithm.
4.4. Data Privacy
The payload contains the identity of the source node (IDx) and the actual data (d). Identity is
encrypted with the public key (k
+
bs) of the base station and data is encrypted with the secret key (kx,bs)
shared between the sender node and the BS. Both are appended with the payload as shown below:
payload = [E(IDx,k
+
bs),E(d,kx,bs)]Sensors 2010, 10 1460
If we assume that the adversary knows the range of identities assigned to the sensor nodes, public
key of the base station and information about cipher algorithm used in the network, an adversary can
then successfully obtain the identity of the source by performing simple brute-force search attack [29]
by comparing the pattern of encrypted identity with a known range of identities. Therefore in order to
provide protection against brute-force search attack, we append a random number (Rn) (equivalent to
the size of identity) with the identity of a node and then perform encryption. Now the payload is:
payload = [E(IDx||Rn,k
+
bs),E(d,kx,bs)]
where || is the append operation. Inclusion of random number may introduce additional computational
overhead. However, the amount of overhead is mainly dependent on random number generation
technique. Recently, very nice random generation techniques have been specially designed for low
power sensor networks, such as [30, 31]. These techniques could be used to generate random number
for each packet. Also, overall computational overhead is dependent on the number of packets generated
by the sensor nodes. Mostly, sensor nodes are event driven or query driven [32]. Therefore, amount of
trafﬁc is usually kept low as compared to traditional networks.
Our proposed data privacy approach provides several beneﬁts. Firstly, data secrecy is achieved in
the presence of identity anonymity. This feature is not available in earlier proposed privacy schemes.
Secondly, the base station will receive both the identity of the actual source node and message
authentication. If the packet has been successfully decrypted with the shared secret key, it means that
packet is received from genuine sensor node.
5. Analysis and Evaluation
5.1. Security Resiliency Analysis
Suppose we have an adversary A who strives to defeat our privacy protocols and guess the original
source node. We will distinguish between two kinds of nodes. A source node is the original sender of
a packet q and a forwarding node is the node that forwards a packet to another node until it reaches the
destination. Hence the source node is also a forwarding node. The adversary’s goal is to ﬁnd out the
source node. This analysis assumes that we are using IRL algorithm including our proposed data privacy
mechanism. So if the adversary sees a packet, it will trivially know the identity of the last forwarding
node (which could possibly be the sender node).
We will deal with separate cases. Case 1 is when the adversary is close to the base station and can
eavesdrop on any packet received by the base station. Case 2 deals with the case when the adversary can
see any packet within the radio range of a particular node. Case 3 extends this into two or more nodes.
An adversary will try to solve the following problem: Given a packet q and a subset of nodes N′, ﬁnd
out the sender node s. In other words, the algorithm for the adversary takes two inputs and outputs a node
s′; Namely A(q,N′) = s′. If s′ = s, the adversary succeeds in defeating our protocol. We have to ﬁnd:
Pr[A(q,N′) = s], which is the probability for an adversary to ﬁnd out the sender node. Our assumption
is that, from an adversarial perspective, all nodes are equally likely to be senders of a packet. This
does not necessarily mean that the network trafﬁc is uniformly distributed. Notice that if the adversary
knows beforehand which nodes are more likely to send packets, then no privacy preserving method canSensors 2010, 10 1461
prevent the adversary from guessing the most likely senders, since this constitutes the adversary’s a
priori knowledge.
Notations and deﬁnitions: Denote a generic node by m. The set of neighbors of m is denoted by
Nm, which also includes m itself. The number of forward and backward nodes of m is denoted by mf
and mb respectively. If a node a is a backward node of m, then we denote it as a → m. We say that
a node a is in the backward set of node m, if a → a1 → ...ar → m, for some nodes a1,...ar where
r ≥ 0. For compact notation we will denote this as a →r m, if the IDs of the intermediate nodes are not
signiﬁcant. We will also use the notation →r m to denote a generic node, who is r links (hops) away
from m. Deﬁne the backward set Cm of m as Cm = {a|a →r m,r ≥ 0}, that is the set of all the possible
nodes such that they have a forward link to m. Denote the base station as B. It will also be seen as
another node. Let the total number of nodes in the network excluding the base station be N. We will use
the term “adversary is in possession of a node” to indicate that the adversary can passively listen to any
communication within the radio range of that node.
Claim 1: Suppose A is in possession of B. Let Bb be the number of backward nodes of the base
station (nodes one hop away from the base station). Then for any packet q received by B and for large
enough N:
Pr[A(q,N) = s] ≈
Bb + 1
N
(7)
Proof: The adversary can always know the ID of the last forwarding node. Let Bb be the number of
backward nodes to the base station. The packet could only have come from one of the nodes in NB−{B}
(which only contains backward nodes to B). Since the nodes are just a hop away from the BS, so they
will not send the packet to another node. Hence for large N we have:
Pr[A(q,N) = s] = Pr[A(q,N) = s|s ∈ NB − {B}] × Pr[s ∈ NB − {B}]+
Pr[A(q,N) = s|s / ∈ NB − {B}]Pr[s / ∈ NB − {B}]
= 1 ·
Bb
N
+
1
N − Bb − 1
(
1 −
Bb
N
)
≈
Bb
N
+
1
N − Bb
(
1 −
Bb
N
)
=
Bb + 1
N

Now let us assume that A is in possession of a node m in the network. The following probability
estimate gives an upper bound of the probability of success of the adversary. It is an upper bound since
it does not include the possibility of a packet sent backwards. When a packet is sent backwards over one
or many hops, the probability of success of the adversary decreases since there would be more possible
nodes. Thus in this scenario our result would be like an upper bound on the adversary’s limitations.
Claim 2: Suppose A is in possession of a node m. Let c = |C→2m| denote the number of backward
nodes in backward set C→2m of some node →2 m. Then,
Pr[A(q,N) = s] ≤
mf+mb+1
N + 1
c+1
(
1 −
mf+mb+1
N
)
(8)
Proof: Since the adversary is in possession of a node m, it knows its backward and forward nodes.
Furthermore, if any of these nodes including the node m itself is the sender of a packet q, then theSensors 2010, 10 1462
adversary will know. This is true since the adversary can see all incoming packets to the node m and to
its neighbor nodes (the forward and the backward nodes). Thus it can see if the payload of q is not equal
to the payload of any q′ being received by these nodes in a given interval of time. If this is the case, then
the adversary will know the sender.
Now if none of the nodes in Nm are the senders, then the packet was forwarded by a node i that is two
hops away from m. The adversary knows the ID of that node through the packet q. Thus the adversary
makes a list of all the possible backward nodes in the backward set of i. Let that number be denoted
by c. Notice that node i could also be the possible sender. Hence the total number of possible senders
would be c + 1. We have:
Pr[A(q,N) = s] = Pr[A(q,N) = s|s ∈ Nm]Pr[s ∈ Nm]+
Pr[A(q,N) = s|s / ∈ Nm]Pr[s / ∈ Nm]
≤
mf + mb + 1
N
+
1
c + 1
(
1 −
mf + mb + 1
N
)

Now, suppose the adversary is in possession of two nodes at the same time; m1 and m2. We can safely
assume that Nm1 ∩ Nm2 = φ, since it would be more advantageous to the adversary to cover nodes with
non-overlapping radio ranges. The adversary will always know whenever any node in Nm1 or Nm2 is
the sender of a packet. How about the case when they are not the senders? There could be two possible
cases: without loss of generality, ﬁrst assume that m2 ∈ Cm1. If the packet q was received by some
node in Nm1 and was received by some node in Nm2 before, then the adversary had already checked it
when the packet was sent to a node in Nm1. Thus the adversary need only check packets received in Nm1
that were not received by Nm2. In this case, the sender cannot be in Nm2. In any case, the adversary
has to ﬁnd out the backward sets of →2 m1 or →2 m2, depending on where the packet was received.
Since, in the adversary’s knowledge, all nodes are equally likely to be senders, the probability of a packet
being received at the two sets is the same. In case m2 / ∈ Cm1, then the adversary has no real advantage
except that it can see packets at two disjoint locations in the network. Thus we only state the case when
m2 ∈ Cm1. We have the following result:
Claim 3: Suppose the adversary is in possession of two nodes m1 and m2. Assume further that
m2 ∈ Cm1. Let c1 = |C→2m1| and c2 = |C→2m2| then:
Pr[A(q,N) = s] = |Nm1|+|Nm2|
N + 1
2
(
1
c1+1−|Nm2| + 1
c2+1
)(
1 − |Nm1|+|Nm2|
N
)
(9)
In general, we have:
Claim 4: Let us assume that A is in possession of k nodes mk →r1 ··· →rk 2 m2 →rk 1 m1 and let
mf and mb denote the average number of forward and backward nodes averaged over all the k nodes.
Let t = mf + mb + 1. Let for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, ci = |C→2mi|, then:
Pr[A(q,N) = s] = kt
N + 1
k
(
1
c1+1−(k−1)t + 1
c2+1−(k−2)t ··· + 1
ck+1
)(
1 − kt
N
)
(10)
Observations: The probability is lowest when the adversary is actually at the base station. If the
adversary has more nodes in possession, the probability increases linearly, with more success rate whenSensors 2010, 10 1463
the nodes are actually connected. This also shows that if a packet originates from any node that does
not have a backward node, the adversary will always know the sender. This drawback can be avoided by
requiring all nodes to have backward nodes. In other words, avoid a tree topology.
The above security resiliency analysis description is for route and location privacy. The security
strength of identity and data privacy is mainly dependent on the encryption schemes. If encryption
scheme is strong then we can achieve stronger identity and data privacy. If encryption scheme is weak
then we have weak identity and data privacy.
5.2. Memory Consumption Analysis
Each sensor node needs to maintain one table that contains the list of neighboring nodes, their
direction and their trust states as shown in Table 2. Node identity can be represent in two bytes [15, 33].
Four sets of directions can be easily represented in 2 bits. Trust calculation is based on time-based past
interaction only. Therefore, the total size required to calculated trust value is 4∆t bytes [22]. Here,
∆t represents size of time window and 4 bytes are required to store number of successful (2 bytes) and
unsuccessful (2 bytes) interactions. Trust value can be represented in one byte. Therefore the size of
each record is 3.25 + 4∆t bytes (26 + 32∆t bits). If we assume that the node has M neighboring nodes
then the total size of the table will be M(26 + 32∆t) bits.
Table 2. Neighbor list table at sensor node.
Past interactions based
on time window
Neighbor
nodeID
(Integer)
Direction
Successful
interactions
(Sx,y)
Unsuccessful
interactions
(Ux,y)
Trust value
1 F (00) 10 ... 5 4 ... 1 90
2 BR (01) 2 ... 4 8 ... 2 25
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
M BL(11) 5 ... 7 0 .. 3 70
In order to achieve data privacy in the presence of identity anonymity, our proposed scheme uses two
keys: one Public key of the base station k
+
bs and other is shared secret key kx−bs. Therefore, total memory
required at the sensor node for our proposed scheme is: M(26 + 32∆t) + k
+
bs + kx,bs.
Table 3 shows the memory requirement of various privacy schemes, in which M represents the
neighborhood size, K represents pseudonym space, 4∆t represents size of time window, and N is the
total number of nodes in the network.Sensors 2010, 10 1464
Table 3. Memory requirement in bits.
PFR [3] (16+1)M bits
PSR [4] (16+16+1)M bits
SAS [5] K(4M+2N)+16M bits
CAS [5] K(6+7M)+16M bits
IRL / r-IRL M(26 + 32∆t) + k
+
bs + kx,bsbits
In the Phantom Flood Routing (PFR) [3] scheme, each sensor node needs to maintain the list of
neighbor nodes and these neighbor nodes are divided into two sets. Here we assume that identity of a
node is represented by two bytes, and set is distinguished by a single bit. So the total memory required
by each node in the PFR scheme is (16+1)M bits. In the Phantom Single-path Routing (PSR) [4]
scheme, each node maintain the list of neighbor nodes, hop count (2 bytes), and set identiﬁcation (1
bit). Therefore, the total memory required by each node in the PSR scheme is (16+16+1)M bits. In the
SAS scheme, each node needs K(4M+2N)+16M bits of memory. Here M represents the neighborhood
size, K represents pseudonym space and N is the total number of nodes in the network. For the CAS
scheme, eachnoderequiresK(6+7M)+16M bitsofmemory. (See[5]formoredetailsabouttheSASand
CAS schemes.)
Let us assume that the sensor node has ten neighbor nodes, then the total memory required by
the sensor node by the PFR, PSR, IRL, CAS and SAS is 21.25, 41.25, 260.5, 628 and 1940 bytes
respectively, as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Memory consumption analysis: N= 100; K=8 bytes; ∆t = 5; k
+
bs = 20 bytes;
kx−bs = 8 bytes.
Additionally, cycle prevention strategy (Section 4.2) requires some short term memory to store
signature of the packet for short period of time (δt). In our proposed schemes, signature of the packet
comprises of six ﬁelds: 1) Sequence number (2 bytes), 2) previous hop identity (2 bytes), 3) next hop
identity (2 bytes), 4) payload (variable size), 5) counter (2 bits), and 6) δt time (4 bytes). So, for each
packet sensor node requires 10.25 + Size(payload) bytes of memory. The packet signature will beSensors 2010, 10 1465
removed from the buffer after δt time. For example, sensor node x received 20 packets of equal size of
payload (e.g., 10 bytes). Then, the total memory required by the sensor node is 20×(10.25+10) = 405
bytes. This additional overhead does not make sensor nodes overloaded because of following reasons:
1. Generally, wireless sensor networks are event driven [34–36] or sensor nodes generate packets in
periodic intervals [37, 38]. Therefore, the amount of overall trafﬁc usually remains low.
2. In our proposed schemes, packets always follow different routes. Therefore, the probability of a
single node to be overloaded is very low.
Let us assume that the amount of trafﬁc is very high and single sensor node needs to store large
amount of packets at a time. Then in order to reduce the size of memory, we can use the technique of
signature generation code [39]. This technique allows us to represent single signature code in few bytes.
However, this technique is based on Bloom ﬁlters [40] that require the computation of multiple hash
values. This may increase the computational cost. Therefore, we need to trade off between memory and
computation cost.
5.3. Energy Consumption Analysis
In this section, we will show the efﬁciency of our routing strategies with existing schemes. Energy is
computed based on the communication overhead (including transmission and reception cost, path length)
introduced by our proposed routing protocols and compared it with other existing schemes.
Table 4. Simulation parameters.
Network Number of nodes 300
speciﬁc Distance b/w nodes 50 units
Mobility of nodes zero
Sensor node’s Initial battery 1 × 106J
Power consumption for trans. 1.6W
Node Power consumption for recv. 1.2 W
speciﬁc Idle power consumption 1.15W
Carrier sense threshold 3.65e−10W
Receive power threshold 1.55e−11W
Frequency 9.14e8
Trans. & Recv. antenna gain 1.0
Protocol & Application CBR
Application Reliability param. r for r-IRL 3
speciﬁc hwalk param. for PFR & PSR 10
WehaveimplementedourIRLandr-IRLroutingschemesonSensorNetworkSimulatorandEmulator
(SENSE) [41]. At the application layer we used constant bit rate component (CBR) that generateSensors 2010, 10 1466
constant trafﬁc during simulation between randomly selected source node(s) and the base station. For
the simplicity, we assumed that both sensor nodes and the base station are static. Network consists of
300 sensor nodes that are organized into 15 by 20 grid manner. Other simulation parameters are given in
Table 4.
We have compared our proposed IRL and r-IRL algorithms with the four variations of phantom
routing schemes [3, 4] that are:
1. Phantom single path routing scheme with hop-based approach (PSR-hop).
2. Phantom single path routing scheme with sector-based approach (PSR-sec).
3. Phantom ﬂood routing scheme with hop-based approach (PFR-hop).
4. Phantom ﬂood routing scheme with sector-based approach (PFR-sec).
We did not compared our schemes with the SAS and CAS [5] schemes because the authors did not
propose any routing strategy.
Figure 6. Energy consumption analysis: simulation time: 5,000.
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The energy consumption analysis with different scenarios are shown in Figure 6. For the r-IRL
scheme we select r = 3, which means a single packet will reach the destination via three different
routes simultaneously. For phantom routing schemes, we select parameter hwalk=10 (as recommendedSensors 2010, 10 1467
in [3]). Figure 6 clearly indicates that, the IRL and r-IRL schemes consume less energy as compared
to the PSR-sec, PFR-hop and PFR-sec schemes but slightly consume higher energy as compared to the
PSR-hop scheme. This is due to the fact that the IRL and r-IRL algorithms provides more path diversity
and packets sometimes took longer paths.
5.4. Path Diversity Analysis
Strength of route privacy is dependent on path diversity. High path diversity provides strong route
privacy and low path diversity provides weak rout privacy. Path diversity can be categorized into
two types.
1. Length variation: Path could be long or short and mainly dependent on routing scheme. For
example, packets always reach to the destination via shortest path. In this scheme, packets may
reach to the destination via longer path if any node is not working properly within the shortest
available path. With respect to the route privacy, length variation provides minimum route privacy.
If we have longer paths, then it will increase time for an adversary to ﬁnd out actual source node
or vice versa. So, the longer path increases safety time.
2. Pathvariation: Eachpacketmayfollowdifferentroute. Itisalsodependentonroutingstrategy. For
example, routing scheme make decision about next hop based on the energy level of neighboring
nodes. With this approach, one can achieve limited path variation. With respect to the route
privacy, if we have more path variation, then it will become clueless for an adversary to guess
from where next packet will come.
Our proposed routing strategies (IRL and r-IRL) have both features. Because of the concept of
direction (Section 4.1), proposed schemes provide more length variation and because of the randomness
(Section 4.2) proposed schemes provide high path variation. Incorporation of both features offer high
path diversity.
Figure 7. Path diversity of privacy schemes.
In order to analyze the path diversity behavior, we have organized 300 sensor nodes in a 10 by 30 grid
manner. The rest of simulation parameters are given in Table 4. In the simulation, a single source node
(ID: 224) generates 100 data packets for the base station. Figure 7 shows the path diversity (in termsSensors 2010, 10 1468
of path length) of the IRL, PSR-hop and PSR-sec schemes. The average path taken by the PSR-hop,
IRL and PSR-sec is 22.12, 36.81 and 38.17, respectively. It indicates that the IRL scheme incurs more
delay as compared with the PSR-hop scheme and less delay as compared with the PSR-sec scheme. This
ﬁgure also indicates that the IRL scheme has more path variation as compared with the other schemes,
which creates more difﬁculties for the adversary to trace back the source from the captured packets.
Figure 7 also shows that some packets took longer paths in the IRL scheme as compared with others.
This is due to the fact that the source or en-route node did not ﬁnd any trusted node in its forward
direction, so the packet is relayed back in the backward direction. If we assume that each node has p
probability to be trusted and all probabilities are independent of each other, then the total probability Pb
for a node i to relay the packet in the backward direction is:
Pb(i) =
mf ∏
k=1
(1 − pk) (11)
where mf represents the number of nodes in the forward direction. Figure 8 shows the result of 100
simulation runs in which we have assumed that each node has equal probability to be trusted and
un-trusted. It shows that, as the neighborhood size increases, the probability of the packet to move
in the backward direction decreases sharply.
Figure 8. Probability of a packet to move in the backward direction.
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5.5. Discussion
From the memory, energy and path diversity analysis, we see that our solution is optimal especially
with respect to the PSR-hop scheme. However, at a modest cost of memory and energy, our solutions
provide full network level privacy as compared with the other existing schemes. This cost is justiﬁable
because we have additionally achieved trustworthiness and reliability (in terms of packet reach-ability).
With this level of resource consumption, our solutions can easily be used on real sensor nodes, for
example, MICA2 sensor node has ATMega 128L micro controller (8 MHz @ 8 MIPS), 128 Kbyte
program ﬂash memory, 512 Kbyte measurement (serial) ﬂash, and 4 Kbyte EEPROM [42].
6. Conclusions and Future work
ExistingprivacyschemesofWSNsonlyprovidespartialnetworklevelprivacy. Providingfullnetwork
level privacy is a critical and challenging issue due to the constraints imposed by the sensor nodes (e.g.,Sensors 2010, 10 1469
energy, memory and computation power), sensor network (e.g., mobility and topology) and QoS issues
(e.g., packet reach-ability and timeliness). Therefore, in this paper we proposed the ﬁrst full network
level privacy solution that is composed of two new identity, route and location privacy algorithms and
data privacy mechanism. Our solutions provide additional trustworthiness and reliability at modest cost
of energy and memory. We also proved analytically that our solutions provides protection against an
adversarywhoiscapableofperformingprivacydisclosureattackssuchaseavesdroppingandhop-by-hop
trace backing.
In our future work, we will evaluate our proposed schemes from the perspective of computation cost
that is required to perform encryption and random number generation.
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